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CLONING, GENETIC ENGINEERING,




Aldous Huxley, it turns out, was partly right and partly wrong. Although
not even he could have foreseen the speed at which fantasies such as genetic
engineering and human cloning would become clinical realities, his prediction
about the power science would come to exercise over reproduction was
surprisingly accurate.' In 1998, "test-tube babies" hardly raise an eyebrow,
and what was once the stuff of science fiction-the artificial womb,
"grandmother pregnancies," and the "made-to-order baby"-is now simply the
next horizon in reproductive medicine. However, as Lee Silver argues in
Remaking Eden, Huxley was wrong when it came to predicting who would want
such power and why: "What Huxley failed to understand, or refused to accept,
was the driving force behind babymaking. It is individuals and couples who
want to reproduce themselves in their own images. It is individuals and couples
who want their children to be happy and successful. "2 At least in the United
States, the most pressing ethical and legal question posed by the advent of
human cloning or genetic engineering today is not, as Huxley supposed, "How
do we protect human reproduction (and human nature) against government
control?" but "Are there any limits to what individuals or couples may do in
their quest for happy, successful offspring, for offspring in their own image and
likeness?"
John A. Robertson, Professor of Law at the University of Texas, at Austin,
has been a strong and articulate defender of procreative liberty in assisted
reproduction. In his well-known work, Children of Choice, he argues that the
legal and social respect extended to coital reproduction should be granted to
those who desire or need to seek assistance in procreating: "if bearing,
begetting, or parenting children is protected . . . those experiments should be
protected whether they are achieved coitally or noncoitally. In either case they
* Ph.D., Yale University, 1993; Assistant Professor of Christian Ethics, University of Notre
Dame.
1. ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946).
2. LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD 9
(1997).
753
Ryan: Cloning, Genetic Engineering, and the Limits of Procreative Liber
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1998
754 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
satisfy the basic biologic, social, and psychological drive to have a biologically
related family. " '
But how far should procreative liberty extend? Should respect for the
"right to reproduce" encompass the freedom to acquire an offspring through
cloning (i.e., somatic cell nuclear transfer), a practice that is not only
'noncoital" but asexual? Does the "right to reproduce" protect the freedom to
select or shape offspring characteristics through genetic engineering, e.g., to
select for intelligence, height, beauty, or even deafness?
There are those who argue that any intervention that serves reproductive
ends ought to be protected to the same degree as coital reproduction.4 Many
argue that if we as a society widely accept the rights of parents to shape their
children's destiny after birth, e.g., to enhance their children's chances of success
through expensive private education, music lessons, and orthodontia, we should
respect their rights to do so before birth.5  Robertson himself however
acknowledges that practices such as cloning and enhancement or diminishment
genetic manipulation push the boundaries of public consensus concerning
procreative liberty. Not "reproduction" at all but "replication," Robertson
claims, cloning by nuclear transfer may simply "deviate too far from prevailing
conceptions of what is valuable about reproduction to count as a protected
reproductive experience." 6 In the same way, he argues, efforts that go far
beyond what is necessary to ensure a healthy, normal birth may not be protected
by procreative liberty to the degree that such actions "conflict with the values
that undergird respect for human reproduction."'
As Robertson admits, however, determining whether cloning or other novel
reproductive options fall under the moral or legal protection of procreative
liberty is difficult precisely because the judgment requires a substantive account
of what is valuable in the experience of reproduction. Discerning the limits to
which parents may go in the pursuit of a certain sort of offspring is equally
difficult, as Robertson also admits. Given the "deep ambivalence that surrounds
the question of whether children are parental property or separate persons," it
is hard to say precisely at what point creating a child "in one's own image and
likeness" crosses the line from parental prerogative to crass objectification.8
3. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 39 (1994) [hereinafter ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE].
4. NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOErHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 95 (1997).
5. See SILVER, supra note 2, at 9.
6. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3, at 169.
7. Id. at 172. See also John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76
B.U. L. REv. 421, 436-40 (1996) [hereinafter Robertson, Genetic Selection].
8. Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 7, at 481.
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This Article intends to show that the problem posed by cloning and genetic
selection of offspring characteristics illustrates the inadequacy of the account of
procreative liberty advanced by Robertson and others in public policy debates
in the United States. Joining his critics, I will argue that the problem of setting
limits to procreative liberty requires a thicker conception of reproductive
responsibility than the liberal rights position provides: having made individual
autonomy the only serious moral value, Robertson is hard pressed to give a
cogent rationale for judging some choices, e.g., somatic cell nuclear transfer or
intentional diminishment, beyond the pale. Moreover, I will suggest that
disagreements over what will count as a legitimate deviation from "prevailing
conceptions of what is valuable about reproduction"9 cannot be solved without
drawing on the very thing current interpretations of procreative liberty such as
Robertson's dismiss, i.e., the deeper religious, cultural, and moral traditions
through which the human meanings of reproduction and parenthood are both
articulated and preserved. It is ultimately an appreciation for the symbolic
significance of reproduction that makes it possible to argue that some practices,
such as cloning, ought to be resisted even if no material or quantifiable harm to
offspring will result.
I do not intend to take up the legal questions at issue in the debate over
procreative liberty, such as the likelihood of courts to include proposed
interventions such as cloning or genetic selection of offspring characteristics
under existing protection for procreative liberty. Also, I will not deal with
whether the harm of offspring or women or families, said to follow from this
or that exercise of procreative liberty, is sufficient to justify restrictions under
the standard of scrutiny used for traditional reproductive decisions. Rather, my
concern is with the moral issues that underlie claims for a right to procreate.
I am concerned, in particular, with the question of whether the reproductive
rights paradigm, advanced most persuasively by Robertson, is adequate for
defining the scope of moral obligations and relationships in assisted
reproduction.
II. PROCREATIVE LIBERTY AND NONCOITAL REPRODUCTION
The basis for procreative liberty lies in the "centrality of reproduction to
personal identity, meaning, and dignity."' 0 The presumptive right to freedom
from interference in reproduction acknowledges the great importance to
individuals of biological and familial continuity; bearing and raising offspring
9. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3, at 169.
10. Id. at 30.
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is a widely valued rite of passage, signifying the transition from adolescence to
adulthood and, for many people, signifying the maturation and fecundity of
marital love.
As a constitutional question, procreative liberty has been affirmed most
directly in cases involving the right not to reproduce, such as the right to obtain
contraceptives or to seek an abortion. 1" The Court has yet to deal explicitly
with the right to procreate, in particular with the claims of infertile persons to
a right to noninterference in assisted or collaborative reproduction, such as
reproduction involving contracts with gamete donors or surrogates. However,
argues Robertson, a fundamental right to reproduce can be inferred from the
Court's recognition of the personal significance of reproduction and the law's
implicit protection for privacy in coital reproduction. Ifi the instances where the
Court has dealt with the right to reproduce, it has treated marriage and
procreation as among the "basic civil rights of man," "essential," and "far more
precious than property rights." 2 As recently as the 1992 decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, Justices Kennedy, Souter, and O'Connor observed:
[O]ur law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing and education. These matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
If the Supreme Court could be expected to recognize a married couple's
right to procreate coitally, it should recognize a couple's right to procreate
noncoitally. "The couple's interest in reproducing is the same, no matter how
conception occurs, for the values and interests underlying coital reproduction are
equally present. Both coital and noncoital conception enable the couple to unite
egg and sperm and thus acquire a child of their genes and gestation for
rearing." 4 Freedom from interference in procreation, as a moral as well as
legal right, ought to be extended to unmarried individuals as well. Reproductive
rights are derived from the central importance of reproduction in an individual's
11. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. Stanley v. llinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE,
supra note 3, at 36-37. See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1973);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983).
13. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
14. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 960 (1986).
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life and require only a capacity to participate meaningfully and an ability to
accept or transfer rearing responsibilities; therefore, all those meeting the
minimum criteria, whether married or not, ought to be free to exercise them.
Because procreative interests are in some instances dependent on the
offspring having certain genetic characteristics, procreative liberty includes the
freedom to manipulate egg, sperm, or embryo to achieve the desired offspring,
similar to the freedom to impede implantation or abort a fetus with undesirable
characteristics. Individuals and couples are not free to alter genetic material in
a way that would cause serious harm to the offspring, but they ought to be free
to do whatever else will facilitate the development of an offspring possessing
those characteristics and traits that make having a child meaningful for them. "S
Procreative rights are not absolute, but "those who would limit procreative
choice should have the burden of establishing substantial harm." 6 Claims of
harm to society-for example, concerns about the integrity of connections
between sexual intimacy, reproduction, and childrearing or anxieties about the
commodification of reproduction-are not generally persuasive enough, in
Robertson's judgment, to override personal liberty.
III. RIGHTS TALK AND THE CRITIQUE OF PROCREATIVE LIBERTY
Critics of Robertson's version of procreative liberty claim that the language
of reproductive rights is inadequate, and in some cases inappropriate, to mediate
competing claims and obligations in the sphere of assisted reproduction. Legal
scholar Mary Ann Glendon, for example, argues that, as a language of social
organization, "rights talk" is inherently flawed. It is rooted in a narrow and
impoverished conception of the good society, predicated on an overvaluation of
the individual, and "inimical to a sense of social responsibility."" 7 When the
primary legal and ethical concern is how to protect the interests of individuals
against the state, there is no impetus for a serious appraisal of the effects of
choices on the common good. Except for the barest requirement that one's
actions not cause material harm to another rights-bearing entity, promotion of
personal autonomy virtually silences all other moral considerations. Only in the
narrowest sense do questions of accountability arise, and then only in the most
immediate of relationships, such as the sphere of freely-chosen commitments.
In the context of assisted reproduction, criticism of rights talk centers, in
part, on its consequences for the general treatment and welfare of children. As
Daniel Callahan wrote in response to the National Bioethics Advisory
15. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3, at 153.
16. Id. at 40-41.
17. Id. at 223. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
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Commission's Cloning Human Beings:
There are . . . useful warnings [in the Commission's report] about
potential hazards to individual children.... There are also plentiful
references to reproductive rights, but for the most part it is the welfare
and desires of would-be parents, not the needs of children, that are at
the core of that notion .... [I]t has been one of the enduring failures
of the reproductive rights movement that it has, in the pursuit of
parental discretion and the relief of infertility, constantly disassociated
the needs of children and the desires of would-be parents. 8
One implication of allowing the interests and desires of would-be parents
to drive decisions about reproductive technology is, as Callahan suggests, that
several questions are rarely asked: how to pursue the welfare of children
generally, what might be required for just reproduction under existing
circumstances, whether some arrangements for reproducing are better than
others for enhancing the status of children in a particular society, and how
investments in potential children relate to social commitments to existing
children. " Reflecting what Susan Jacoby called "a pervasive sense of
entitlement," the argument from individual rights in assisted reproduction too
easily trivializes the analysis of means, abstracting the technology from its social
context and its implications.20
Even more serious, for many critics, is the potential for rights talk to erode
or compromise the primary relationships through which, generally speaking, the
welfare of children has been secured. Laura Shanner voices this criticism in a
recent article where she argues, "A key problem with claims of a right to
procreate is that they too often sound like claims to objects or material
resources. "2'  Indeed, there are some reproductive objectives (e.g., those
requiring the use of genetic screening, selective embryo transfer, abortion, or
genetic engineering) that can only be accomplished by treating the potential
offspring as an object to be created, manipulated, and destroyed according to the
terms of the reproductive contract.
18. Daniel Callahan, Cloning: The Work not Done, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at
18, 19.
19. Id.
20. Richard A. McCormick, Blastomere Separation: Some Concerns, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 14, 15 (quoting Susan Jacoby, Do We Have Fertility Rights?, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., Nov. 28, 1993, at 27A.).
21. See Laura Shanner, The Right to Procreate: When Rights Claims Have Gone Wrong, 40
MCGILL L.J. 823, 859 (1995).
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However, parenthood, by definition, is the establishment of relationship.
In reproducing, one does not so much "acquire a child" as bring into existence
a unique and separate individual who, through the care and encouragement of
the parent(s), will grow under normal circumstances into social and moral
agency. Focusing on the "unilateral, autonomous rights of prospective parents,"
argues Shanner, "fails to account for the role and status of the child who is
produced and who has no say in his or her creation or role in the family."'
Moreover, children are not like cars or other objects, acquired and disposed of
according to present tastes, nor are they simply extensions-of the self. Rather,
while "external to oneself .... [the child is] part of an existentially self-defining
relationship. . . Recognition of the child as an other who defines oneself
captures a[n essential] quality of transcendence . "..."23 Not entirely of
oneself, still the child reflects oneself, one's past and future; he is potentially
autonomous, but only by virtue of relationships of care and nurture. In this
sense, "'having children' is phenomenologically equivalent to 'being a parent,'
much as having true friends is experienced as being a friend, or having a lover
involves loving. This attitude of transcendental recognition opens . . .
possibilities for interaction, response, appreciation, and understanding of the
child as a unique, developing individual."24 The prevailing paradigm of
procreative liberty is deficient from this standpoint in that it encourages an
objectifying notion of "acquiring children" over a relational notion of "having
children."' Such a view of parenthood is not only impoverished but ultimately
destructive of children's interests.
Critics also point to the potentially destructive effect of the procreative
liberty paradigm on understandings and experiences of familial relation. As we
saw earlier, the importance of reproduction to individuals is assumed to generate
the right to manipulate egg, sperm, or embryo to achieve the desired result, to
terminate gestation or prevent implantation in the face of undesired results, to
enlist the aid of collaborators, and to enter into reproductive contracts for the
exchange of gametes or gestational services. What emerges is a view of
reproduction in which preconception contracts play the decisive role in defining
22. Id. at 858.
23. Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. A similar argument is made by Oliver O'Donovan and Gilbert Meilaender on theological
grounds. The religious language of "begetting" captures this sense of an otherness and distinctive
nature to the child, who is received in trust but never possessed. OLIVER O'DONOVAN, BEGOTTEN
OR MADE? 1-13 (1984); Gilbert Meilaender, Begetting and Cloning, FiRST THINGS, June/July 1997,
at 41. As Meilaender writes: "Our children begin with a kind of genetic independence of us, their
parents. They replicate neither their father nor their mother. That is a reminder of the
independence that we must eventually grant to them and for which it is our duty to prepare them."
Meilaender, supra, at 42.
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rearing rights and duties and in determining the meaning of "parent," and in
which the only relevant responsibilities are those that are freely chosen.
Also in question is the underlying presupposition of this view that the
genetic-gestational-social dimensions of reproduction can be severed at will and
without cost. 26 One need not deny that many viable forms of family life exist,
it is argued, to think that there are good reasons, nonetheless, to preserve the
"natural" relation between biological and social parenthood and its fundamental
dependence on spousal love and fidelity. We need only to observe the intense
interest of adopted children in finding birth parents or the strong bonds related
strangers feel to find truth in the insight that "corporeal, kinship bonds are
important to our identities as human beings."27 Driven by the professed
importance of genetic connection, a contract view of reproductive rights and
duties, paradoxically, relativizes genetic or biological connection in the name of
reproductive liberty. Speaking of donor methods of assisted reproduction, for
example, Lisa Sowle Cahill charges:
[They] may satisfy the "needs" of the contracting parties, but they do
so at the cost of denying the significance of the important dimensions
of the relationships they create. While adults may use the arrangement
to bring to fruition their own hopes, they create a birth situation in
which the child's "natural" relation of offspring to parent is [a priori
and intentionally] impaired. 28
Critics hold that parent-childhood is best understood as "an embodied as
well as freely chosen relationship," and as a relationship that is best carried out
"as an extension of the mutual spouse-parent relationship (also embodied as well
as freely embraced) with which procreative sexual intercourse ideally connects
it."29 Two claims are implicated. The first claim is that faithful, committed
relationship between spouses provides the most desirable context for procreation
in which, at least ideally, children have the benefit of genetic continuity and
stable relationship with both biological parents.' The second claim is that
normative features or "core values" of marriage are both identifiable and worthy
of social protection. Once again, one need not deny the variety of forms
marriage has taken across periods and cultures to admit that it is the assumption
26. See Maura A. Ryan, The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Libeny: A Feminist Critique,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 1990, at 6, 9-10.
27. Lisa Sowle Cahill, Moral Traditions, Ethical Languages, 14 J. MED. PHIL. 497, 519
(1990).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 521.
30. Id. See also Stephen G. Post, The Judeo-Christian Case Against Human Cloning,
AMERICA, June 21, 1997, at 19, 22; Ryan, supra note 26, at 8.
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of physical and psychic partnership that defines marriage, that the mutual genetic
contribution to offspring is a central (albeit not necessary) feature of the marital
union, and that there is an implicit understanding that partners will procreate,
if they are to at all, within the union. That marriage, as physical and psychic
partnership, and parenthood, as extension of spousal relation, have long been
protected in law and custom is taken as a rough consensus, if not affirmation.
Undermining the core values of marriage or the "ideal" conditions for
reproduction is assumed by those who reject reproductive rights language to
have negative consequences not just for the parties to any particular instance of
marriage or reproduction but to people or society in general. Although many
who share the concern would not express it in these terms, the Vatican
document Donum Vitae captures something of the deep discomfort characterizing
the critical position. Speaking of donor methods of assisted reproduction, it
argues:
[They] offend(] the common vocation of the spouses... and deprive[]
conjugal fruitfulness of its unity and integrity; [they] bringf! about and
manifest[] a rupture between genetic parenthood, gestational
parenthood and responsibility for upbringing. Such damage to the
personal relationships within the family has repercussions on civil
society: What threatens the unity and stability of the family is a
source of dissension, disorder and injustice in the whole of social
life. 31
In its strong form, as in the Vatican document, concern for the integrity of
marriage and the intimate family issues is a rejection of all forms of assisted
reproduction. In its weaker, more common form, it is expressed as a kind of
protective dam, placing the burden of proof on any proposed exception to the
norm for human reproduction to show that it does not undermine the core values
or ideals at issue.
Although feminists do not, in general, share such concerns for the impact
of the reproductive rights paradigm on the integrity of the nuclear family, there
has also been a strong feminist critique of the right to procreate motivated by
broad commitments to social justice. Some feminists reject the very language
of reproductive choice as often illusory for women, particularly for the infertile.
As Rosalind Petchesky notes, "[T ]he critical issue for feminists is not so much
... 'the right to choose' as it is the social and material conditions under which
choices are made. The 'right to choose' means very little when women are
31. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN
LIFE IN ITS ORIGINS AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION (Donum Vitae) Pt. II A.2 (1987).
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powerless . "..."32 In the context of assisted reproduction, women are
"powerless" insofar as fertility is bound up with self-esteem and social status in
such a way that they are not free to forgo the pursuit of pregnancy without
penalty. Women are "powerless" insofar as reproductive technologies
concentrate patriarchal and medical power over reproduction, reinforcing the
dual identification of women and women's bodies with reproduction and the
alienation of the fruit of her labor. Women are "powerless" to the extent that
they lack the economic means or social leverage to access available technologies
on their own behalf, or are made vulnerable to exploitation either as patients or
as collaborators. Rights talk in assisted reproduction is dangerous if, as is often
the case, the defense of personal liberty papers over the realities of race, class,
economics, and politics that will determine how the technology will be used, for
what, and by whom.
Even when feminists do not reject the language of procreative liberty
outright, they subject it to a certain "hermeneutic of suspicion." Feminists such
as Christine Overall distinguish carefully between support for the right not to be
compelled to bear children against one's will (the protection of bodily integrity)
and support for the right to pursue reproduction through whatever means are
available and necessary. Assertion of a right to procreate has troubling and far-
reaching implications:
It shifts the burden of proof on those who have moral doubts about the
morality of technologies such as IVF and practices such as surrogate
motherhood (as many feminists do). For it suggests that a child is
somehow owed to each of us . . . and that it is indefensible for society
to fail to provide all possible means for obtaining one.33
It would seem to imply, she argues, that fertile men with .infertile wives are
entitled to the services of a surrogate, that fertile people have an obligation to
donate gametes to the infertile and genetic surrogates should be compelled to
surrender their babies at birth, and that anyone who so desires is entitled to
adopt a child.' At risk, then, is not just the objectification of children, but the
objectification of women and of their reproductive capacity. Feminists have
insisted, therefore, on the need for a women-centered assessment and
appropriation of reproductive technologies, joining a brutal honesty about the
interests likely to be served and the costs entailed with a clear memory of the
ambiguous quality of reproduction in women's collective history.
32. Rosalind P. Petchesky, Reproductive Freedom: Beyond 'A Woman's Right to Choose,' 5
J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND Soc. 661, 674 (1979).
33. CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 170
(1987).
34. Id.
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Supporting an ideal of inclusive community, feminists have also been
deeply suspicious of the largely unexamined eugenic ideology in the background
of the debate over access to reproduction. As Robertson defends it, procreative
liberty includes the right to refuse transfer, terminate gestation, or manipulate
genetic material in the face of undesirable characteristics.' But the promotion
of individual liberty in this case has the potential to reinforce negative standards
of "normality" and to sanction ultimately dangerous models of human
perfection. In addition to freedom from genetic disease, the offspring qualities
most likely to be selected are those that correlate with high social status, such
as intelligence, beauty, maleness, and height. Given the reality that "rejection
is the flip side of preferential breeding," feminists worry both about the victims
(direct or indirect) and the society we will eventually create. 6
How seriously ought these objections to procreative rights language in
assisted reproduction be taken? Children of Choice shows more sensitivity to
the critique of procreative liberty than Robertson's earlier essays.37 He readily
acknowledges the deep ambivalence many people feel over the expanding
intrusion of technology into reproduction. Anxieties about the impact of
reproductive technologies on the status of women or the health of the family are
understandable. They ought to invite serious public reflection. Yet, in the end,
his defense of the rights of individuals to pursue their reproductive goals remains
largely unchastined. "In nearly every instance," he argues, "public policy
should keep the gateway to technology open, allowing individuals the freedom
to enter as they will. " 31
Robertson dismisses many of the concerns raised above as "speculative
fears" or "symbolic perceptions," too weak to prove the case for restricting a
particular technology. 39 The argument that a commitment to the well-being of
children ought to make us wary of severing genetic, gestational, and social
bonds at will, for example, is simply unpersuasive: "The intentional creation
of families with an absent genetic or gestational parent is a problem only if
being reared in a situation in which one biologic parent is missing is itself
generally harmful."' Only under circumstances in which collaborative
reproduction caused severe handicap or disability of the sort to make the child's
"very existence a net burden" would it be legitimate to override procreative
liberty.4 In much the same way, Robertson minimizes anxieties over the
35. See generally ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3.
36. For a description of the problem of eugenics, see McCormick, supra note 20, at 15.
37. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 12, 14.
38. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3, at 221.
39. Id. at 222.
40. Id. at 121.
41. Id. at 120-22.
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objectification of children. Parents reproducing coitally have complex
motivations; among them are selfishness and proprietary interest. We should
not expect any less from those who want to reproduce noncoitally. Moreover,
"harms" of this sort, even if they can be demonstrated, are not normally severe
enough to override the presumptive right to procreate.
Arguments against the procreative rights paradigm which invoke the
integrity of spousal-offspring relationships are also weak. Such criticisms
"reflect moralisms concerning a 'right' view of reproduction";42 even where
some consensus exists, a majoritarian view of "'right' reproduction" or "'right'
valuation of prenatal life, family, or the role of women should not suffice to
restrict actions based on differing individual views of such preeminently personal
issues."" Harms to individuals must be distinguished from harms to "personal
conceptions of morality, right order, or offense," and even the former must be
demonstrable as implicating tangible interests."
Can the procreative liberty paradigm stand against its critics? Is it adequate
for understanding moral obligations as well as moral entitlements in
reproduction? As we will see, when we turn to the problems of cloning and
enhancement genetic engineering, it becomes obvious that the critique is more
damaging than Robertson admits.
IV. PROCREATIVE LIBERTY AND THE BORDERLINE CASE
There is a term used by twentieth century German theologians to describe
the exceptional or "borderline" case in ethics. In the Grenzfall (or
Grenzsituationen), the usual moral rules do not apply, or their standard
application does not seem to fit. Creating confusion or dissonance, the
borderline case calls the moral system into question, revealing its present limits
with a particular clarity.
The problems of cloning and non-therapeutic genetic engineering prove to
be Robertson's Gren4fall. The case of intentional diminishment is especially
revealing. Even for him, some things that would-be procreators might want to
do seem clearly beyond the limits of procreative liberty, such as creating
"replicants" programmed for premature death (as in the 1982 Ridley Scott film
Bladerunner) or intentionally causing deafness in one's offspring. But as he
stumbles to find a justification for drawing the line at this point, he shows
exactly why the individual rights stance fails as a moral paradigm in assisted
reproduction. Having effectively subordinated all other values to the interests
42. Id. at 35.
43. Id. at 41.
44. Id.
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of procreators in pursuing a satisfying reproductive experience, he cannot
provide a convincing reason, consistent with his position, for why we should
object to this use of reproductive technology any more than to any other use.
On what grounds does Robertson hold that the Bladerunner scenario or the
interests of a deaf couple in having a deaf child fall outside the protection of
procreative liberty? Procreative liberty does not include the right "to create
offspring who have fewer capacities than they could otherwise have had," he
argues.'5 But why not? If the offspring in question would not otherwise be
born at all, and the diminishments are not such that existence would be
preferable to nonexistence (as in the case of the intentionally deaf child), what
moral objection can be offered to procreation under these circumstances?
Robertson's answer is worth quoting at length:
[P]rocreative liberty is a protected activity because of the importance
of reproduction to personal identity and meaning. When one
deliberately tries to have a less than healthy child to serve extraneous
goals, the reproductive interests that are ordinarily valued are so
diminished that a meaningful conception of the values underlying
procreative liberty appear to be absent. Indeed, the [Bladerunnerl
scenario here treats the engineered individual as an object or thing to
serve the fabricator's interests, rather than a new person desired in
part for her own sake. Even if no harm accrues to the lesser
engineered person (who has no alternative unharmed way to exist) and
the fabricator would not otherwise have created a healthier or more
whole individual, one can still conclude that the interests and values
that underlie respect for procreation do not attach [here] ....
In the case of the intentionally deaf child, Robertson argues that a couple
has no more right to produce a handicapping condition than to deny an existing
child necessary treatment for a potentially handicapping condition: "Unless it
can be shown that children born to such parents are in fact better off if they
share the parents' disability, stopping parents from prenatal lessening of
offspring abilities would not, under the view [he defends], interfere with their
procreative liberty. "' It is the interest in producing "healthy, normal children
for rearing" (which is not the case with enhancement, diminishment
interventions, or cloning), which "gives the freedom to reproduce its value.""
45. Id. at 170.
46. Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 167.
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Prescinding from the question of whether there might be reasons to think
that the child of deaf parents might in fact be "better off" sharing his parents'
disability, how does Robertson arrive at the conclusion that it is only the interest
in producing "normal, healthy children for rearing" that warrants protection?
Throughout Children of Choice, it is the procreators' interests in a meaningful
reproductive experience that drives the argument for procreative liberty.
Moreover, in an earlier discussion, he rejects "wrongful life" arguments against
protecting the right to bring a child into the world in a diseased, handicapped,
or economically impoverished situation: "If offspring are not injured because
there is no alternative way for them to be born absent the condition of concern,
then reproduction is not irresponsible because of the effect on offspring who are
born less whole than is desirable." 4" We might think it morally reprehensible,
for example, for a woman to give birth to a child with a withered arm when a
brief delay in conception might have avoided it, although the decision might be
defended given the "net benefit" to the child. If the action is wrong, however,
it is not because she has harmed the child; she has simply "violated a norm
against offending persons who are troubled by gratuitous suffering. "50
Robertson anticipates the question of how he arrives at this seemingly
contradictory conclusion:
Of course, one might ask why only the interest in raising "normal"
children should be protected, if individuals find the same or greater
meaning in raising supernormal children [or we might add,
"subnormal children"]. At some point a constitutive notion of why
reproduction is important has to inform the debate, or else there are
no limits to shaping offspring characteristics at all, not even when
cloning or intentional diminishment is involved.5
But that is precisely what is missing from Robertson's account of
procreative liberty: "a constitutive notion of why reproduction is important"
capable of generating the conclusion that deliberately trying to have a less than
healthy or whole child violates the core values underlying procreative liberty.
The only notion that Robertson provides as to why reproduction is important
concerns its importance as "an experience central to individual identity and
meaning," and as a means to fulfill important life plans and satisfy desires to
transmit genetic heritage.52  Nowhere do we get an argument for the
importance of reproduction to societies, which would tell us why aiming to
49. Id. at 76.
50. Id. The case to which he is referring is drawn from Derek Parfit, On Doing the Best for
Our Children, in ETHICS AND POPULATION 100-15 (Michael D. Bayles ed., 1976).
51. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3, at 167 n.40.
52. Id. at 24.
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diminish an offspring's capacities for social participation or other forms of
selective breeding might be said to violate core values supporting procreative
liberty, or for the importance of reproduction for children, which would tell us
why it matters that we desire our children for their own sake.
More important, as Shanner points out, what is missing here is the
recognition of reproduction as establishing an "existentially self-defining
relationship" between persons who are distinct however much intertwined.53
There is nothing in the contract model of reproduction, predicated on the
protection of individuals' negative liberties, that explains why it is better to have
children (in the relational sense) than to acquire them (as we acquire other goods
conducive to the satisfaction of our desires). Moreover, "[wihen liberties,
contracts, and autonomous agreements are emphasized in pursuing the objective
of having a baby," as we find in Robertson's defense of procreative liberty,
[Tihere seems no reason to prohibit contracts for more specific
objectives, such as producing a set of matched offspring [or producing
an enhanced offspring] . . . . There is nothing within a contract
model... to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate activities, nor
to promote the objective of forming a healthy family rather than
acquiring children as objects.'
Indeed, preventing this slippery slope in perceptions and behaviors demands
what Robertson elsewhere denies but here implicitly admits: that "any contract
or agreement be framed in light of values and principles external to the
autonomous exchange paradigm.""
Neither do we have an account of the status of children that would explain
why, even if no harm accrues, it would be wrong to bring a human being into
the world merely to serve the "fabricator's" purposes. Only an account of
offspring as potentially autonomous beings with a fundamental human dignity
would explain why it is morally wrong to treat them as objects or things, or to
manipulate genetic characteristics to serve personal reproductive goals. The
Bladerunner scenario is provocative by virtue of its crassness. But it merely
brings into relief a deep social ambivalence concerning the status of children
which Robertson's defense of procreative liberty leaves unchallenged. He
concedes that we are confused about whether children are property or persons
in the full sense. Most reproductive decisions aim at producing a healthy,
normal child; therefore, conflicts between property or personhood paradigms are
53. Shanner, supra note 21, at 859 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 862.
55. Id.
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usually of little importance, and we should aim to protect reproductive
liberty.56 But the problem of the procreator whose reproductive intentions
involve going "beyond what is needed for a healthy birth"-Robertson's
Grenzfall-illustrates why the implicit view of children as property that pervades
reproductive rights talk is neither unimportant nor benign. It illustrates as well
why an approach to procreative liberty that subordinates all interests to those of
the procreator is deficient. Here at the boundary, Robertson needs exactly what
he has not given us: a way of thinking about just reproduction in which the
interests of children are integral rather than accidental.
Cloning is a different sort of borderline case, but it raises similar problems
for Robertson's defense of procreative liberty. Often lumping cloning with
nontherapeutic genetic engineering, Robertson argues that such actions are not
protected by procreative liberty, as the interests involved "conflict with the
values that undergird respect for human reproduction."" At points, this is
simply a formal claim: cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer may not involve
"reproduction" at all if the procreators are not using their DNA or the cells of
a previously born offspring.5 8 Even when an individual is cloning his or her
own DNA, the process may be better described as "duplication" or "replication"
than reproduction. We just do not yet know how to place interests in
"duplication" or "replication" within the legal and social categories we now
employ to talk about reproductive rights.
But in distinguishing cloning from other interventions that aim at creating
a healthy, new, biologically related offspring for rearing, Robertson is also
making a moral judgment. Cloning is wrong, he argues, not because it
necessarily harms offspring, but because it-like intentional diminishment-goes
far beyond what is required for a healthy birth. Cloning "breaks the constitutive
rules of protected reproduction"; it "deviate[s] too far from prevailing
conceptions of what is valuable about reproduction to count as a protected
reproductive experience"; and it "pass[es] beyond the central experiences of
identity and meaning that make reproduction a valued experience.""
But, once again, Robertson appeals to something he has not given us: a
substantive account of the "constitutive rules of protected reproduction," a sense
of what we mean by "central experiences of meaning and identity" in
reproduction, and a rationale for treating one individual's interest in "self-
56. See, e.g., Robertson, Genetic Selection, supra note 7, at 481-82.
57. See ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3, at 172.
58. By "cloning," Robertson is referring to somatic cell nuclear transfer. Elsewhere, he treats
cloning by blastomere separation as simply an extension of procreative liberty. See John A.
Robertson, The Question of Human Cloning, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 6.
59. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3, at 169.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 [1998], Art. 17
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss2/17
19981 LIMITS OF PROCREATIVE LIBERTY 769
replication" differently than another's interest in genetic transmission. Indeed,
even in suggesting that procreative liberty intends to protect interests in
producing a "new, biologically related child for rearing," Robertson has
qualified his earlier position. In defending the rights of couples to contract for
embryo donation, for example, he acknowledged that the recipient would not be
reproducing in the strict sense. Yet the desire for a child to rear and the
"gestational connection" (which substitutes for "biological relation") in that case
was sufficient to invoke the protection of procreative liberty. Moreover, an
earlier agnosticism about the meaning of "reproductive interests" has now given
way to the assumption that procreation entails aiming at a new, healthy,
biologically-related child for rearing. The significance of reproduction is no
longer simply whatever the procreator finds meaningful.w
Explaining why cloning is morally distasteful, why exerting such a
pervasive control over the new individual "violates a basic sense of what makes
reproduction valuable," requires mining the very "majoritarian view of 'right'
reproduction" that Robertson has previously silenced as a threat to individual
rights. 6 We know that an innovation breaks the rules and exceeds the limits
of exception only by testing it in light of the deeper cultural and religious
traditions upon which our understanding of the rules depends. It is hard to see
why self-replication should not count as a protected reproductive experience
except against the belief, held by many religious traditions, that reproduction is
at its core a shared enterprise, a partnership involving mutual genetic
connection. It is hard to see why the degree of control over the offspring
expressed in cloning should be troubling unless we accept and understand
something of the warning that children are to be "begotten, not made." It is
hard to see why we should count the introduction of asexual reproduction, of the
child with a single progenitor, as an unwelcome advance, except against long-
held and deeply valued understandings of parenthood as a powerful symbol of
sexual intimacy's "two-in-one flesh" character.
The problem posed by cloning or non-therapeutic genetic manipulation is
one of degree, of determining when an intervention deviates so far from "even
pluralistic notions of reproductive meaning," so as to undermine the rationale
for reproductive liberty.' But such cases reveal the need for a much broader
conception of "reproductive meaning" than the simple invocation of individual
liberty. It is only by giving voice to the symbolic, to particular accounts of the
nature of children or the human significance of reproduction capable of calling
into question private conceptions of reproductive meaning, that it becomes
possible to draw coherent boundaries of the sort Robertson now draws. More
60. Id. at 32.
61. Id. at 41.
62. Id.
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important, such cases bring home the mistake of supposing that the language of
procreative liberty can be detached from the religious and cultural traditions on
which our understandings of the core values of reproduction depend and in light
of which we know what ought to be protected.
Many objections can be raised to Robertson's defense of procreative liberty
in assisted reproduction. Among the most important are some we have not
even addressed here: the commodification of reproduction, the potential
exploitation of patients and donors, the effects of "reproducing for excellence"
on individual children and on society as a whole, and the impact of technology
on the lives of women, particularly those who are infertile. It has been enough
here to show that the procreative liberty paradigm fails on its own terms.
Having reduced the moral dimensions of procreative choice to individual
autonomy and the pursuit of one's reproductive goals, Robertson cannot provide
what the problems of cloning and non-therapeutic genetic engineering require:
an understanding of human reproduction that would tell us why we need not let
people do anything they want, in the pursuit of whatever reproductive goals they
happen to have.
V. CONCLUSION
Two important questions remain. Suppose we agree that the language of
rights fails to capture adequately the moral geography of assisted reproduction.
Suppose we find the account of procreative liberty in Children of Choice
deficient. What language, what account of reproductive choice, would suffice?
And suppose we think that some reproductive interventions go too far. How
should we promote responsible reproduction?
Neither of these questions can be answered here. But it is clearly not
enough merely to raise the problems with "rights talk" as applied to assisted
reproduction. We need some other way of thinking about freedom in
reproduction that can take account of the importance of bodily integrity, of not
being forced to reproduce against one's will, at the same time as it rejects the
assumption that we are entitled to the child we desire. We need a way of
thinking about reproduction that protects the ability of parents to raise children
according to their religious and cultural values without falsely construing
reproduction as an isolated or private matter. The failure of rights talk to
generate a satisfying ethic for assisted reproduction points to the importance of
shifting from an individual to a relational and social understanding of
reproduction and shifting from a view of rights as claims against the community
to a view of rights as mutual accountabilities.
We also need to discern the most appropriate way to draw limits on the
development and use of reproductive technologies. We can fault Robertson on
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the definition and scope of reproductive liberty and still agree that banning new
or troubling technologies is not necessarily the best way to encourage
reproductive responsibility. Some innovations, such as cloning, may be so
destructive of persons or of conceptions of human reproduction that they should
simply be prohibited. But the fact is that the barn door on reproductive
technologies is already wide open. Ultimately, the legal measures we adopt as
new technologies are introduced will be far less important than the questions we
come to ask of existing technologies: what we demand medicine to do for us,
how we weigh our wants in relation to others' needs, and whether we listen or
grow deaf to the human body's own wisdom in counting the costs. How we will
use the power to create ourselves in our image, for what and for whom, are not
finally, or even in the first place, legal challenges at all.
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